Panel #5: Institutional Arrangements in Solar System Exploration – PART 2

>> Our next speaker is Michael Nuefeld from the air and space museum to talk about APL and the discovery program. >> Thank you. While waiting for this to come up, some of you know me from — brown V 2, and after doing that, I had to find something else to do. >> I existed that line of attack, and I had begun thinking about several topics, and what I hit upon for the moment was an interest in the entry of the applied physics laboratory, which most of you in this room, we are an insider audiences is only 30 or 40 miles away, on the way to Baltimore. The fact that I was a ons Hopkins Ph.D., had a minor interest in the JPL, but it was mostly because Bob Fahrquar wrote his memoir.

What this project has moved into is the origins of a discovery program, and on the origins of the new horizons mission to flew to. You already had background here in previous talks, notably, Mr. Callahan's talk yesterday with all those budget graphs, and you talked about the lost decade of the 1980s, and today, Mr. Russo talked about the changes, especially in this narrow band of time. It is almost a standard narrative from the planetary scientists about this topic, that there was a sense of cry says at the end of the 1980s. And you saw from the graph, the lack of watches until 1989, though I should know that was partly an artifact of the shuttle disaster, and there might have been launches in '66, '87, but there was a period of decline or decrease in funding.

What you found interesting was when I phoned up Leonard Fiske, he gave a completely different picture of what planetary scientists, notably, planet hunters that I have talked to, he said this was a great period of expansion. He came in. The budget of NASA started going up as a result of Reagan, and then Bush. First Bush. He pointed out that there had been an agreement made between the NASA administrator that 20 percent of the budget would be allocated to space science. This was made in 1984. It was a result of the near death of the planetary program and the general reduction of the space program at the beginning of the 80s.

So NASA's budget was going up, and therefore, the office of space science and applications, as it then was, that budget was going up quickly at this time, and there were a number of missions delayed by the shuttle disaster that were going to be launched. Notably, the Hubble space telescope, Galileo, Magellan, this was not a period of glam and doom at all. It was a great period, with him being AA, but this was when things started going really well. Certainly this wasn't the feeling that the planetary science community felt at the time because of the lack of launches, because of the gap, and one of the responses to this was do we need a small spacecraft program, particularly in view of the failure of the observer line, and Mars observer in particular, to live up to its budget requirements. I know there is an argument that whether the Mars observer narrative that we hear, that it was a program out of to control and too expensive really was. I know Eric Conway was that part of the problem was that it had to be delayed from '90 to '92, and that greatly added to its cost.

There was a sense, then, that there was a need for some other smaller missions to inCree the flight rate, to increase the amount of data coming back to deal with the problem of these gigantic flagship missions that were eating up the entire budget. As far as I can tell from the documents I have been able to find, the initiative for a shu small spacecraft program started with Jeff Briggs. In the spring of 1989. And he actually created a small initiative. And it was part of the strategic planning that OSSA was making at that time. And Len if I can be told me he invented the idea of strategic planning at NASA.

At any rate, there was a strategic planning process going on in OSSA in 1989. One of these workships was — workshops was at the University of New Hampshire, so this small program initiative was going to be discussed there. But there was a lot of hostility in the community as well, at least skepticism in the community about the small mission program because the basic message was, well, we tried it with observer and it was a complete failure. Why should we try another one? Planetary missions cost hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, there isn't anything to do about that. And there is the problem of piling on. Everybody says it's the last bus out of town.

Therefore, we have to get our instruments on it. The early idea was converging on the idea of NEAR, near earth ast rendezvous. There was the more ambitious run to the CRAFT mission, but it appeared that a near earth asteroid mission, which was relatively low energy and complexity might be a good candidate mission for a small spacecraft. However, there was the the skepticism in the plan Tory sciences — planetary sciences world. Duokey actors —
and this is a picture of at some time, which is an audience I don't have to introduce him to. An eminent space plasma physicist. He had beginnings at Iowa, doctoral student and a post-doc on mariner 4, and I don't know who these other gentlemen are, somebody in the room might be able to tell me. This is the low energy charged particle experiment. He had a position of considerable influence in the area of space physics as a sunt of van Allen, a successful PI and O-I and experiments to every planet.

He said when new horizons placeses Pluto, he will have — been the only scientist on every planet
in the solar system. At this time, Tom was the chief scientist of APL's space department. I should say something about the space department here for context. Although in this discussion, in my paper and everybody else has written about APL and JPL, and competition, it's not about competition, between JPL and APL, which has been a Navy funded laboratory but between the space department, and was 10% of APL's complement of people, the space department built its reputation on the transit for the Navy and had been involved heavy with SDIO missions in the 1980s, and as we transition into this period, was actually looking essentially, — would be transI can saying, again, under the leadership of Tom, who was head of the space department at the beginning of 1981, to have more NASA missions.

At the New Hampshire conference in June 1989, Krimigis intervened in one of the discussion about what kind of low cost program could there be, and that was, you guys are looking at the wrong model. It's not Mars, it's the explorer program. Explorer should be the model for what a small spacecraft line should be. It has constrained costs. He was challenged to present something to demonstrate how that could even be possible. And he called his secretary, had her fax up the view graphs he made for the advanced composition ex-ploser that APL was going to build and this is a page from the fax that was sent up to New Hampshire in presentation graphs that he made about this. And I just want to read from oral history because it tells the story much better than I would ever tell it. It had all the ingredients of planetary spacecraft. The rocket engine, the instruments, the solar panels.

Then at the end, he said, how much does it cost? I said, you guys seem to be experts in cost. You tell me. What do you think this mission should cost. He said, $400 million. I said, you have one zero too many. I said, what are you talking about. The spacecraft is about $40 million and the instruments about $30 million. Coming out of that workshop, they decided to study the concept of a small spacecraft mission based on an explorer model. I think it's interesting that Tom is poet a participant in the planetary sciences community and Helio physics. He had this dual perspective that allowed him to look across the lines that planetary scientists hasn't known much about exploring, he said, to his great surprise. So in 1990, the discovery science working group was created, and bob Farquhar was named to be program chief of this program the science working group held two meetings and the NEAR concept that mortgaged from the New Hampshire workshop as the probable next mission and a way to go didn't go anywhere.

Actually, it's a long story, and I'm going to take up way too much time to to talk about it. But it does seem to have languished in the 1989- 1990. One theory is there was a lack of urgency from the top. Things seemed to be going well. There was lots of money. Was this urgent? Maybe not. Another question was the creation of Bush's space exploration initiative caused a replanning process inned planetary program in what are we going to do in a human mission gnars distracted. Not much happened in that year, and NEAR was not funded as Krimigis had expected. We have Wes Hunter here. I'm used to writing about dead people or — [ Laughter ] It's a little intimidating to sit here and talk to the participants. But when he became chief of SEED in 1990, replacing Briggs, with the three oral histories, discovery was one of his three major objectives.

Interestingly, one was an extra-solar planetary mission. He decided to revive this initiative, he revised the science working group, created a technical commitee, Jim Martin of Langley as the head of the technical community, and said, go out and try to get this thing going and go somewhere. At this point in time, at least by what huntress' account, who could be the head at JPL. This is a story that is not entirely unflattering to JPL. The perception that he and others had was it was wedded to giant, expensive project, could not adapt to a small, low cost mission, was very resistant to any other organization having any piece of its turf.

Was afraid some other organization would come and steal its charter. So it was very earth satellites sis tant, and huntress looked around, and what are the options? NRL was an option, but didn't seem interested, our friends A.Ames, he didn't have confidence in Ames anymore, and that left APL as one of the most likely candidates for a competition — a competition whose project was maybe not only to get discovery started and to do a good near-earth asteroid mission but to get JPL shaken up and be motivated to do better. This led to the funding of the NEAR project in fiscal 1991. And a showdown that happened in Pasadena in May, 1991, APL versus JPL, the proposal idea. The outcome of that was rather a legend at APL and forgotten at JPL. JPL's proposal was a disaster and was prosupposed for a $450 million program that would take three missions just to get to the asteroid. APL proposed a 100 million-dollar mission. So huntress picked APL. I'm talking too long.

We're running out of time to tell the rest of this story — but he decided in part because the superior proposal with APL after JPL got a second chance, and it's because he was looking for a way to stimulate JPL to think about doing something new and try a different way. He picked out Tony Spear, who had been project manage on Magellan, save him to run a small project office. At the time this NEAR mission seeminged it should go to APL, and he created a lunar mission called lunar scout. Unfortunately, after that creation, it was stolen away by Mike Griffin, who had been appointed to code X, exploration to revive the Bush exploration mission. So APL lost the moon for a while, and I quote, he said, that real real — really pissed me off. So we got to fly a Mars mission at JPL. So out of this came the Pathfinder proposal. And there was a study for measure Mars environmental survey mission, and a Pathfinder mission to a network, and let me summarize more quickly here, a microrover was added.

At the end of the process, which happened during the winter of '91-'92, the decision was to incorporate the Pathfinder into discovery. The basic measure for discovery had been $150 million, FY '99 project. This would have to come out of the cap, but the rover came from a different part of NASA and was a separate thing. It was extra. So the decision then was to make Pathfinder first, and to push NEAR into the background. To push it to second. So push it out of being first in line, which did not make Tom Krimigis happy at all. So this would lump the NEAR launch into 1998. This is, of course, now, we're talking about 1992. But the funding for discovery could not happen until the next fiscal year, so it would not come up for budget consideration until the spring of 1993, and essentially, there was a year where APL, which was ticked off by this sudden demotion to second in discovery program, didn't couple about into a political consideration. However, Tom Krimigis told bob Farquahr to find another mission. And they found one to Eros in 1996. This would greatly accelerate the program, and have a spacecraft in only two-years.

Pathfinder was still first in the budget consideration when it came up in 1993. And NEAR was at best, minimally funded in that year, but Tom Krimigis was not able to take that lying down. The reason he was age able to do anything at all was that he had a long history, a close association with snore Barbara Mikulski. And intervened with that offers, and the snore changed the whole dynamic. The budget would have funded Pathfinder basically and NEAR on a small budget for a 1998 launch. Instead, but using the political system, they were able to get inserted into the bill the full funding for NEAR on an accelerated launch skem by launching in February 1996.

As a result of that, very abbreviated version of that history, the discovery program started in the fall of 9193 as a — 1993 with two new missions than would otherwise have been. One of the questions we have to ask is whether it plight have resulted if it had the been funded, would it have been a one-year mission for Pathfinder? Goldin was only interested in Pathfinder and didn't know much about NEAR. So my fundamental interpretation that I have offered in this paper, although Jeff Briggs had a role in starting the project, that the two key actors that made it happen were Wes huntress and Tom Krimigis.

Without them, it may not have happened at all and become the project for planetary exploration it has become. Thank you very much. [ Applause ] >> One or two quick questions. [ Laughter ] Speaking of participants talking too long — >> Just a comment. On your last slide there. Dan Goldin and I were not unaware of what the final outcome might be. We were actually happy to see it happen that way. Ask which final outcome? >> That we would give a start for two, not one.

>> But one of the things was he was angry about the snore's intervention? >> He was. >> I should add an appendix to that. I have not mentioned Goldin because he doesn't deserve much credit or blame in all this. The key to faster, better, cheaper was done without him, and his basic contribution was to stay out of the way. It would not have necessarily continued without the continual support of an administrator that wanted it to happen.

>> That is a lot of background that I have wanted to have for years, and I'm coming at this from the perspective of someone involved with discovery almost from the inception. In 1996, I was asked by the assistant director of the lab to head the discovery program. I knew about APL, what a technical power house there were, and I knew about Tom Krimigs and the relationship with the snore, and I took that competition extremely serious. I think I was asked to do the job because I was on an earth science mission. At the lab, my friends said, why are you doing this? This discovery thing is never going to last. That was the attitude there for quite a while. Now I can tell you that today, I just passed the reins to someone else after inciting was selected. It's a core part of what we do at the lab, and not only that, it has had a profound impact in how we do strategic mission planning. We have fall-back options, more owe bust reserves, threshold payloads and a review process over the strategic missions now that we never had before.

I think it's going to help us keep them in track in the future. I think the ramifies — ramifications of discovery are
that important. >> Thank you. >> Thank you. [ Applause ] >> The final paper this afternoon is from peter Markovsky from the University of Oklahoma. A subject near to my heart. >> I just wanted to make a quick note. On the program agenda, I originally wanted to talk about you lessees and Giado, but my project evolved to talk about Ulysse as he. In may 1987, upon reflection on American and European cooperation in space, emphasized a free and openings change of views between the United States and Europe. He stated that it's true, and we should never deny the fact that we live into world of conflicting or divergent interests. But I believer many of our present problems can be so on offed more easily when there is a community of scientists and scholars that cooperate. In the decade, involving the collapse of the original agreement on the international solar polar mission in 1981 this mission would reemerge as Ulys sses.

– – in the earlier 1960s. Today, I hope to show you how the history of the Ulysse as he mission can be reframed within historical literature that marries the — narratives of space exploration. My work is an attempt to build upon what a historian claims is a multiple narratives engendered by national claims, which have been a staple of space history. While these contexts have had a tremendous influence upon the American and Soviet programs, what about those runs which matured in the postcold war era, such as in China, Japan, or others, and in European integration? In the talk, I will detail the 25 year of Ulys ses from its conception to its launch. In doing so, I will attempt to reframe the history in transnational perspective. First, I will demonstrate that the spacecraft can be seen as a transnational object. It's the cooperation is embedded in the technology itself, which was negotiated and shaped by the multitude of American and European actors. Second, in detailing the history from the perspective of a number of historical actors, I will show the emergence of varied means and magics of cooperation amidst the larger development of the joint mission.

All right. So shortly after the launch of sputnik, space scientists began to discuss spacecraft for a number of scientific investigations. Immediately, scientists on both sides of the Atlantic observed solar capen 'ts. They began to — solar exploration, one of which was an ecliptic mission. One of — in Europe, two champions emerged. Ludwig Bierman and one from Britain. Bierman wrote the value of the mission. As an appointed chair of the British national commitee on working group 3, he successfully steered his commitee that an out of Clint inning mission — novel scientific results and stimulating the nation's err yo space industry. From 1968-1971, he had mixed success for this, but ultimately, his efforts resulted in the April 1982 European space very search organization mission definition study. But the early 1970s, there were parallel developments among NASA and American say so scientists regarding the feasibility of such a mission. As it was seen as a potential mission for NASA's program.

By this time, American scientists and engineers were developing solutions for missions that a possibly mission might face, and tech issues facing future probes. In July 1971, the Ames research center published the pioneer Jupiter swing-by out of ecliptic stud study. This would use the spare pioneer spacecraft for pioneers F and G, cheerlead become pioneers 10 and 11 repeckively. Respectively. While a number of administrators recognized the to fennel benefit, there were a few concerns. The chief of laboratory for extra terrestrial physics at Goddard expressed concerns about using a back- up pioneer. He said it seem like a worthwhile mission scientifically, but might not fully capture the potential. He urged the adoption only if the payload be considered. In response, budget restraints were cited. About a year later, homer Newell expressed more concerns about the back-up pioneer. The suggestion was to keep pioneer H as a back-up in case pioneer 10 did not provide data like radiation
and the environment in enterplanetary space.

As we have seen in yesterday's talks, which highlighted budgetary concerns in this period, NASA became increasingly supportive of joint international missions. American scientists' reactions were varied. By summer of 1974, some expressed concern about the perceived lack of consultation. John Simpson wrote to James Fletcher in 1974 expressing the necessity of such a mission. He said I was shocked that NASA had invited a European space group to take over this mission. I find this incredible, since I can think of no other mission with the dollars spent on this major mission. Thus, the participation is hard to justify within the United States. [Brief pause in captions to change captioners] >> He recognized by me decade that while US scientists are — operation, Congress on the other hand was more interested in cooperation in spacious things in general. According to him, Congress would use such cooperation as funding requirements, whereas US scientists reported such missions would interfere with US and foreign experiments, as a reduction in their own opportunity to do research. >> In a tight budget climate, two different concerns from two different concerns seemed to place their opinions at odds.

[ Indiscernible name ], and perhaps to other NASA administrators, cooperation would be a good compromise for all parties involved, as collaboration would produce an increase in the number of flights, and an increase in total opportunities for US scientists. >> Moving on. By the end of 1974, two made of elements led to what would eventually become [ Indiscernible – low volume ]. In Europe, it was considering mission priorities for the 1980s, a mission to study coronal phenomena for a worthwhile candidate for future missions. As launching — including both OOE and the stereoscopic vision of top priorities, which led to a combination of stereoscopic missions, and the OOE once. This essentially proposed fee mission — the mission which was launched two satellites, which were with bonds over the North Pole and South Poles. >> NASA seemed to agree, and according to James Fletcher, the best chance of implementing equipment is with a mission mode that would attract as wider constituency as possible.

Something that combined stereoscopic and OOE missions would do. These developers created the right atmosphere for cooperation. In 1974, NASA and [ Indiscernible name ] agreed to cooperate onto joint missions and the joint science review. One of the programs was a combined stereoscopic OOE mission. >> Combining two missions was favorable to both NASA and ESRA administrators, and as a result of the science working group was established to perform at optimal mission mode. In the first two months of 1975, based on the joint study, science planners recommended that a OOE told stereoscopic spacecraft using the Jupiter gravitational system was the most suitable candidate. >> As historian Carl [ Indiscernible last name ] has showed, — Europe's prime space station emphasized a number of priorities for the cooperative OOE mission, such as clean interfaces, involvement in choices of experiment, and principal investigators. Observations of Jupiter be made during the swing by, and the conviction that the two spacecraft options remained essential. >> Overall, bite me decade, mission constituencies for a OOE mission became broader, larger and decade. In April of 1977, NASA and ESA began listing proposals for the OOE, and by March of 1978, April of 16 experiments were chosen for more than 200 scientists from 65 universities from Europe and the United States.

>> While the specific technical and scientific capabilities of the OOE mission were developed , securing funding for the cooperative mission had increasingly become a problem. For instance, in May 1987, NASA was able to take a $77 million chunk for the fiscal year 1978 budget. This had an impact on the program. Especially in the [ Indiscernible – low volume ]. >> The House of Representatives approved $17.7 million for the Jupiter probe, and although they had a stipulation, that was that upcoming plans start for OOE would use a modified version of the Jupiter orbiter probe . Just, both OOE and the Jupiter orbiter were connected. The new budget approval for the Jupiter orbiter, the OOE would have without the budget approval and the OOE with [ Indiscernible – low volume ]. >> Requesting more funding for the mission, which by late 1977 was renamed the solar polar mission was becoming difficult.

NASA secured observation from the OMB for an initial fiscal budget of $30 million. That was their only new start for that year. Despite the issues, one year later in 1978, after intense lobbying efforts of the American space community, and the first director of the NASA solar trust real division, Jimmy Carter approved the solar portal mission. >> Six months later, in 1979, NASA and ESA signed a memorandum of understanding for the international solar polar mission. As prior to the signing, [ Indiscernible ] was already facing budget issues. In January 1978, NASA submitted a budget revise for fiscal of 1979 which included $13 million, claiming it was one of their new start programs for that year. Although Congress approved it, they cut $5 million of the budget in order to reallocate those funds to cover costs for the spatial development. By the end of the year, the Senate appropriations subcommittee wrote to NASA administrator Robert Frost, suggesting that [ Indiscernible ] cannot be delayed citing two reasons.

Delays in shuttle development and the committee was concerned with the [ Indiscernible ] necessary would not be adequate and that NASA should develop a high energy buffer state instead. >> Despite $135 million worth of contracts already funded by this point, it was teetering on the edge of cancellation. As the Carter administration submitted an amended budget for fiscal year 1981, it was called for a two-year — $43 million cuts. The cuts were protests by a number of groups, which included not only European nations but also the White House and State Department. White House officials sent a letter to Massachusetts representative Edward [ Indiscernible last name ], that it threatens international cooperation with states but other areas of technology as well.

>> A few months later, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a 1980 supplemental appropriations bill that ISPM the Council, citing among other reasons that the two-year delay would cost at least an initial $150 million. While it reacted to the possible cancellation with strong diplomatic protest, Florida Representative. Don [ Indiscernible last name ] successfully argued that the cancellation would consider legislation and appropriation bills, a violation of policy rules. >> As Joe Johnson freed the show, the state of ISPM took a turn for the worst in 1980 as a whole budget of process and attitudes fundamentally changed with the election of President.

Ronald Reagan and the deployment of David Stockton as director of OMB. By early 1981, it became clear that the Reagan administration's proposed budget cuts for NASA were canceled by ISPM. After Reagan took office, OMB amended the fiscal year 1982 state funds budget by almost 23%. He effectively signaled the cancellation of the American portion of ISPM. This was an almost unilateral decision by the Reagan administration — from both American and European allegations that >> American politicians decried that the lack of a new start of products could jeopardize the ability for NASA to be a scientific engineering leader. ESA responded it to be an acceptable breach of the memorandum of understanding. As a response, NASA and the Reagan administration offered reassurances that the US would remain as part of the ISPM mission at reduced capacities. Which Europe viewed as an acceptable as well. >> In March of that year, ESA deployed [ Indiscernible ] against the decision. Director general of ESA at the time, air credit card stated to the health and — that could not be expected at such an event stage for ISPM development and after a commitment of more than half a year for funding, NASA presented ESA was a [ Indiscernible ] of its withdraw from international cooperative programs, especially without prior consultation.

>> He further went on to tell the committee that the short-term financial advantage for NASA [ Indiscernible ] the following week, [ Indiscernible name ] and ESA expressed willingness to compromise as long as the US was willing to reinstate its spacecraft. Despite the promising efforts in the early summer of 1981, newly reinstated NASA administrator on September 9 said, NASA would not include any request for funds for the second ISPM spacecraft in the fiscal 1983 budget. He did offer support of encouragement for ESA to pursue a single spacecraft mission, in which NASA would fulfill any remaining commitments.

>> By the end of the year, the dual spacecraft ISPM mission was officially out of commission. Despite the cancellation of the US craft, ESA decided to continue with its solar polar probe, citing substantial commitments already made thus far. In the early 1982, ESA stock continued interns on NASA and Congress. They also made a point to discuss and develop and establish a framework for future cooperative ventures. The start of what Johnson Friess characterizes as a strategy that ultimately may ESA stronger and a more independent agency. >> Moreover, in July of 1984, ESA announced the renaming of ISPM to Ulysses. While they suggested the name change was chosen to reflect the hero in the Odyssey, and the reference to Dante's Inferno, perhaps the name change also reflects a long, arduous journey of development. >> While it was scheduled to be launched in May of 1986, the challenger accident delayed further launch indefinitely. A new launch date was eventually chosen, after the restoration of the shuttle program, and Ulysses was finally launched as part of FGS 41 in October of 1990.

>> So, what makes the history of Ulysses transactional? To start, I would like to suggest that the technological components of the spacecraft itself is an example of a transactional object. As a mission and spacecraft, it was negotiated a long transactional lines in which a host of factors and institutions helped shape the technological component itself. That is, if development in what would eventually become as a result of a was — of different factors Inc. walk ration of European and American space stations. >> Finally, I would like to conclude with another aspect of Ulysses history that benefits from this perspective. The approach I have taken highlights the change in meaning and imagining cooperation and collaboration between the various actors and organizations, such as the number of individuals at NASA and ESA , as well as scientific and engineering communities. It seems at different times, different individuals in different sets of values or perhaps no value at all, in cooperation in an [ Indiscernible ] omission. Furthermore, Ulysses provides an interesting case study for such analysis.

It complicates the cooperation in the sense that it was a field project as the original conception dissolved. >> While the original vision of a cooperative ISPM mission failed, the project lives on. The actual material objects created, Ulysses, and the Ulysses probe continued, albeit in a different form. In this light, I would like to ask a question. What exactly is a failure? While the ISPM was never launched, some form of a transformation at eventually made its way around Jupiter towards the sun. While I cannot provide a concrete historical answer as of yet, I think reframing Ulysses in this way, hopefully I can T.

Off the more interesting and nuanced aspects in failure more generally, in space exploration and cooperative space exploration. >> To conclude, I have demonstrated why how adopting transactional perspectives might enrich our understanding of international cooperation for space exploration more generally. While I have scratched the surface in this paper, I believe that I have adopted this perspective ended by help us understand the very meanings of collaboration, constructed by both NASA and ESA. Thank you. >> [ Clapping ] >> We will have all of the panelists, I'm so that you can ask your questions. >> [ Pause ] >> Thank you. This is for the last speaker. I wanted to ask or push a little bit more to a light to expand on the notion of a transnational object. Particularly distinct from a boundary object. Especially in the light of current trends and transactional steering policies, for example, that would inspire us to step away from the idea that nationstates are the boundaries by which national or transnational collaboration should be understood.

And how that is tricky in the case of space missions when you have large institutions that are bound up in national frameworks, but also that represents national interests. I am wondering how looking at, say, the Ulysses adds a transnational object inspires us to break apart our notion of the singular, for example, European space stations, etc.? >> And a longer story, I did not outlet in the paper, or in my talk, but in the paper there are a lot more discussions about specific components.

One such thing was kind of the components that an RTG was eventually used for Ulysses. But, I think that in focusing on these discussions, which were within the specific communities themselves, they were not necessarily discussions among administrators to administrators. These were in a different scientific communities, are doing this configuration is better or this configuration is worse. Or something along those lines. >> I think sort of prioritizing the top down view and teasing out these smaller kind of arrangements and arguments and discussions, it won't necessarily completely push a national context, but it won't prioritize it as a major focus.

>> Thank you. >> Did the clamps of the Green Bank telescope create concerns? >> Sorry? >> The radio telescope, the Green Bank, the collapse a few years ago. >> Oh, in 1998? That is a good point. Because the Green Bank, I think it was the 120 foot telescope that collapsed. That was put together very rapidly for a very [ Indiscernible ] designed to be used for a very short period. But, it was continually extended, of course, it was a transit instrument. And it failed from metal fatigue and so on. But, the telescope is designed to have a lifetime of about 20 or so years. And last year, we celebrated the 50th anniversary with and new upgrades that we were doing. We are going to probably continue for many more years to come. >> But, no, I think a lot of the uses for the Pax telescope or uses for the instruments at Green Bank, the national radio astronomy Observatory in West Virginia, and there are always a lot of close ties between the two radio as Tony communities.

And I think — radio astronomy communities. At the time, I think it came as a surprise. It came as a surprise to the observers at the time. >> [ Laughing ] >> I was not expecting that. I hope that it never happens to [ Indiscernible name ], because the control room is directly under the dish. So, yes, the replacement of it, the 110 foot Green Bank telescope is a magnificent instrument, and I certainly hope that it is able to continue. I understand that it is under some threat, because of the reassessment of its funding and so on. But, it really is a magnificent instrument, the replacement for the one that collapsed. And as I said, I hope that it does continue. >> This is just a further comment for Peter's excellent study on Ulysses. International issues, and what I find interesting is despite the natural end, what you describe between the communities involved, because everybody helped, if not portrayed at least built with fairly by each other's government. And so forth. Within a few years, we were actually cooperating, as you point out on a number of things, interestingly enough, one of the most important corporations was on the return to flight launch schedule.

Because as they got scuttled — as they caught the shuttle going again, both Galileo and Ulysses wanted to launch in the same opportunity. They were going to The Same Place, Jupiter. The windows for the same period is — the windows were the same. >> As it turns out, Peter Wenzel, the scientist for Ulysses and myself, to work with our original project groups to develop the argument as to who should go first, because the Admiral. truly said, I cannot want you both in the same month. That puts too much risk again you guys back into space. And, we did the very chemical of the with both of our Ashley to the very amicably, with both of our PSGs having — that is an example of how the international [ Indiscernible ] was developed on this, despite the stresses and ended up coming up with an amicable solution. >> Yes, I think that is one of the interesting aspects about this story.

Despite all of these conflicts involve, things do happen. Things did happen. And seemingly, you know, in the early 80s, ESA really saw the cancellation of the US spacecraft at — as, to them a big deal on breach of agreements, as though they would reach any other political treaty. But despite all of that, things do still happen. >> Mr. Burke, I would appreciate your insight as to the role or affect that the Apollo program had on Ranger. You have already indicated a reduction to just the TV as the payload, but I would be very interested to know if there were other reasons for that, related to Apollo, especially. >> The Apollo program had some effect on Ranger. Primarily an indirect effect of causing the community interested in Ranger, Boston JPL and the scientists and everybody involved, really, really wanted some success. And that is why the block of Rangers six, seven, eight and nine had a simplified objective of not trying to land on the moon, stop, and have a seismometer, but just crashed with the television on the way in.

>> Simplify the objective, just changing the payload, leaving the bus to the same, you see, simplifying the objective by putting the RCA camera payload on, instead of the more complicated objective of a retro rocket radar trigger, if all that has to survive, etc. All of the things that Soviets did with Luna 9, eventually in 1966, simplify the objective, in the attempt to get a success was the number one priority. The number two priority was to get some images that might be useful for Apollo. >> But, images can't really tell you what you really want to know, that is the thing. Is it going to sink in or upset or whatever? So, Ranger did move the subjective towards support of Apollo, but it could not really go very far, taking pictures on the way in is all you can do. And yes, we got three beautiful successes with thousands and thousands of good images.

Whether the Apollo enters — designers paid any attention to that, I don't know. >> Thank you. Stomach in listening to all of the talks, what strikes me is that perhaps things in the past were not as different as they are today. It sounds like in each case, there were technical issues going on but were running into political issues and political cycles that were running on time scales that were much shorter than the technical ones.

>> And so, I guess I am just wondering. Right now we are working with a planetary budget here in the US that has already precipitated. Nude issues with cooperation with ESA, not terribly unlike what happened with Ulysses . And, we have either got a going out of business sale, or a bump in the road, depending upon how things come out, sort of like what had happened with perhaps the discovery program. >> I am just wondering, hopefully history is good, because it helps to inform the future.

And I am just wondering if perhaps all of you might comment a little bit on, you know, what are the real lessons that we perhaps should have learned from all of this? And how can those perhaps help to inform us of what we should be doing to keep going forward? With all of the physical issues today? >> You know, as historians, I guess we never really want to talk about predicting or influencing the future. We are mostly interesting in explaining the past. But clearly, we have seen and have multiple papers throughout this conference that the issue of budgetary cycles and political changes means that you have to very much put current crisis in perspectives, and realize that your problems are not new at all, and more of the cyclical nature. That is not a very good answer to your question. >> Because lessons learned probably is useful to the actors and the participants to just be conscious of the larger context in which they operate. >> I am going to follow that up a little bit. A different direction, but I think it is related. The difficulty on Ranger that caused me to be replaced by but sure Meyer, my good friend, originated really, not because of the five consecutive failures over which I presided, but rather, with the attempt by members of the scientific community to add space physics experiments, eight of them, a Ford — aboard Rangers At a time when we were in trouble already.

My version of it was, look, we are trying to do something about the move. Spaces it is wonderful. Does — go do some expansions on a spacecraft more suited for that. One of these out there, goes around and does things. Nowadays, there are hundreds of them doing awful things for all the way up to the Voyagers. In fact really a sphere. So, spaces existing reach — adding them to the Rangers at a time when we are already into further trouble for something I just did not want to do. And remember, I still thought the project manager had a lot more authority than I really did have, so I pushed that at NASA.

Very hard. >> That might have been a strong contributor to the cup size of the project and the replacement of the project manager. >> [ Laughing ] >> Arguments between those communities, interestingly enough, and, that exact dispute erupted again during the discussion of other missions between the space physics community, planetary, geology, etc. >> At that stage, it was not so much a contest anymore. It was more about differing communities offering — operating in different worlds and not actually communicating.

I mean, [ Indiscernible name ] says that I was amazed that the planetary scientist did not know anything about Explorer. A famous name in the history of satellite development. >> I hate to interrupt, but we have two more questions and if we could get them in very quickly with quick responses. >> Following up on Ralph's question, which you commented that we have been through these ebbs and flows before and there is nothing new under the sun, in a sense. However, when talking to some of the folks from the early days when things really looked dire, this was back in the early 80s, and I mean people like Lou Freidman, who I don't know if he is still here right now.

I said, how do things compare today on the risks of the planetary program futures, compared to them? He said that he thinks it is much worse. It is a much more dire situation, potentially. >> As a historian, can you help us mine from the lessons of the past what maybe some of the key things that we ought to be doing are today? In order to make sure that we do not suffer the fate. >> You are the second person to ask me to help you do the future. >> [ Laughing ] >> What things worked in the past? Just share those. What were the things that really helped turn things around? >> Actually, John would be the better person to talk about the survival crisis of dirty 80s — early 80s than I would.

Clearly, having a program of missions,Discovery is a good model, in many ways, for having a line and program and a consistent direction. It is hard to sustain something like that with the huge flagship programs pretty can only afford a multibillion-dollar program every once in a while. It is much harder to keep a sustained project like that. >> There is considerable attention to convincing the political establishment that there is more important and new information to come out of this. Oftentimes, it boils down to the case of Tom [ Indiscernible last name ], and I'm sure that Barbara Mikulski thinks the science coming out of Goddard into the Maryland institutions were great, but her first concern with high-paying jobs in Maryland, keep them there. And obviously, this boils down to going back to politicians and arguing for sustaining institutions that are contributing a lot to the economy.

And science is a nice byproduct of that fact. >> Of it, well I am going to commit one of the things that I don't condone, which is I am going to common — comments more than question. I'm going to dispute what Greg said, and also somewhat the premise of Ralph there. I think there is a fundamental difference today than in the past. There are a number of things about those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it, and there is the thing that history does not repeat itself a rhymes. >> We have learned things, there are things that are different today than back in the period that a number of these people were talking about. We have a decade-old survey now. We didn't have that process. I am a big believer in the process, having seen it work. I think it has credibility. I think it has external credibility to important political constituencies. >> And then we have program lines, like Discovery, like New Frontiers. Another big difference that we have is you are less likely to see today the big gaps in exploration programs that we saw in the past.

I mean, how long did we go between Mars missions? How long did we go between lunar missions? And no, those things are much more included in discovery — Discovery and other program lines. And it seems like, you know, I know that you guys rely on your day-to-day existence upon new programs coming along. >> But, I think that there is a certain progressive trend in what has happened that we have learned from some of these errors.

It does not mean that we are not going to commit that mistake again. >> Thank you very much. Please join me in thanking the panel. >> [ Clapping ] >> My last line is, perhaps our troubles were a necessary step in the evolution toward a harmony that we have today. >> [ Laughing ] >> [ Clapping ] >> Thank you all. This was a well-timed panel, because we are on time as we go to our freight. We will be back here — as we go into our breakthrough will be back here at 3:15 PM. >> [ The event is on a break and will resume at approximately 3:15 PM EST. Captioner standing by ] >> We are getting ready to start the last panel. Come on in and have a seat. >> All right, if everybody could take a seat.

Before we start our last panel, we have one more special thing to do. I would like to introduce Jim for that. >> Great, thank you very much, Bill. It is my great pleasure to present our last planetary science division award. This is an incredibly important individual in the history of planetary science. From 1971-1978, he basically had my position. And, I have to tell you, his career is really unbeatable. I know what he went through. He has written a fabulous book which is back on the display. >> In fact, six years ago, when I had the opportunity to be the planetary science division director, I found out about the book and read it thoroughly.

In fact, what is really great about that is that how rivalries between scientists, how the work between projects, with federal budgets, how we help to restate the missions and meet challenging schedules and configurations. I know what that is all about. A number of people here do. Let me tell you his record. >> 1971, Mariner 9 was launched. 1972, Pioneer 10 was launched. 1973, Mariner 10 was launched. 1971 — 1975, Vikings 1 and 2. 1976, Helios 2. 1977, — 1978, Pioneer and Venus. If that is not a planetary gold inside, I do not know what is. It is a great pleasure to give the planetary science award to Robert [ Indiscernible last name ]. >> [ Clapping ].

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